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RECENT CASES 505
cational specifications, and residency at the time of application
for admission. 8
Commentators have expressed favorable opinions as to the de-
sirability of minimal residency requirements 9 while the length
of such periods remain currently debatable. Lipman in failing to
recognize the presence of a fundamental right, avoided the appli-
cation of the strict compelling state interest test which would place
such short term pre-admission residency requirements for bar ap-
plicants on a doubtful constitutional footing. The significance of
the decision can be appreciated with the recognition that many
states require six months of residency" while most others vary
in decreasing magnitude.41 The logical extension of Lipman in
light of the Keenan decision would seem to indicate further abro-
gation of residency requirements in the future, with a narrowing
definition of their permissible length measured against a demon-
strable state interest.
PAUL E. GODLEWSKI
INTOXICATING LIQUORS - PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY - LIA--
BILITY OF TAVERN OWNER FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY INTOXICATED
PATRON-Appellant, motorist, brought an action against a tavern
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-03 (Supp. 1971).
39. Note, Residence Requirements For Initial Admission To The Bar: A Com-
promise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 843 (1971). See generally
Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions, 28 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 102 (1944); Note,
Restrictions on Admission to the Bar: B%-Product of Federalism, 98 U. PA. L. REv.
710 (1950).
40. The validity of a six month residency requirement for bar applicants now appears
to be questionable after the recent decision of Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme
Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii, 1971). Plaintiff was a member of the
armed services stationed in Hawaii and had statutorily qualified for the bar examination
in all respects except for residency. A statute required all voters over the age of fifteen
years-six months to reside within the state six months before being eligible to register.
By Hawaii Supreme Court Rules, rule 15(c), all bar applicants had to be eligible re-
gistered voters in order to qualify for examination. The Federal District Court found a
violation of Equal Protection stating:
The periods of required residency in the statute and the rule here bear
no valid relation to the educational and moral qualifications of bar appli-
cants, and are thereby arbitrary and capricious and constitutionally imper-
missible. Both the act and the rule thus severally invidiously discriminate
against an identifiable class, favoring registered voters or six-months re-
sidents over otherwise equally qualified applicants who have not the same
residential status.
Id. at 1398.
In applying the traditional test, Potts, along with Shapiro, Webster, and Lipman
left no indication as to the presence or absence of a compelling state interest. Effectively
avoiding the latter issue the Potts court opined:
By so holding, we need not consider plaintiff's contention that the residency
requirements impermissibly penalize his constitutional rights to interstate
travel or any other constitutional right.
Id. at 1398.
41. See Note, Residence Requirements For Initial Admission To The Bar: A Com-
promise Proposal For Change, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (1971).
506 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
owner for injuries sustained when appellant was struck by an auto-
mobile driven by an intoxicated patron. Appellee demurred to the
complaint on the ground that at common law a vendor of intoxicating
liquors is not liable for injuries sustained by third persons by reason
of a patron's intoxication. Finding the common law rule patently un-
sound, the Supreme Court of California held that the sale of liquor
to an intoxicated patron was the proximate cause of appellant's in-
juries thereby imposing liability on the vendor. Vesely v. Sager,
5 Cal.3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
Traditionally, the common law does not impose liability on the
vendor' of intoxicating liquors for injuries sustained by third par-
ties who have been injured by an intoxicated patron.2 This is to be
distinguished from those cases in which the consumer himself has
sustained personal injuries which have resulted from his intoxica-
tion.3 Although several states have enacted Dram Shop or Civil
Damages Acts4 which provide a remedy unknown to the common
law,5 this comment will restrict its examination to an analysis of
the reasoning behind the traditional common law rule and that of
the case at bar which has found the common law rule unsound.
The common law rule of non-liability to the vendor of intoxicat-
ing liquors for injuries sustained by third persons due to the intoxi-
cation of a patron is generally based on three arguements. First,
some courts consider it the patron's own failure to exercise ordinary
1. The word vendor as used within this comment is intended to designate one who
sells liquor and not one who furnishes liquor gratuitously.
2. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovlch, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alas. 1950); Collier v. Stamatic,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) ; Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 565 (1965)
Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1943);
Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969) ; Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa
358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958) ; Stringer v. Calmes, 167 Kan, 278, 205 P.2d 921 (1949) ; Lee
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966) ; State ex rel. Joycce v. Hatfield,
197 Md.249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) ; Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 430
P.2d 358 (1969) ; Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966) ; Seibel v. Leach,
233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
3. In the absence of statute the consumer of intoxicating liquor has been unable to
recover against the person furnishing the drinks for personal injuries which have resulted
from the intoxication caused by the liquor. The prevalent view, appears to be that what-
ever wrong may have been committed by the person supplying the liquor, its effect or
causation of the ultimate injury is considered to be terminated by the voluntary act
of the consumer in drinking the liquor. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1965) ; See Noona v.
Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955).
4. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, §§ 135-36 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (liability on seller
and owner of premises for any sale contributing in whole or part to intoxication);
IowA Cooe ANN. § 129.2 (1946) (liability for illegal sales and compensation for care
where sale is illegal) ; MicH. ComP. LAws § 436.22 (1967) (liability in cases of illegal
sales) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972) (liability for injuries caused by intoxicated
person) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (Supp. 1971) (liability for sales in violation of
law); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101 (McKinney Supp. 1964) (liability in case
of unlawful sales) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (1957) (liability for sales to minors and
habitual drunkard after notice).
5. The Civil Damages Acts provide a remedy unknown to the common law in so
far as they Impose upon a liquor vendor liability to third persons for the resulting sale
of intoxicating liquors where such sales are lawfully made and not made in violation
of any duty owed to a third person. In many cases involving Civil Damages Acts the
courts have said in effect that the particular act under consideration provided remedies
unknown to the common law. Annot., 130 A.L.R. 361 (1941); See Demge v. Felerstein,
222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936) ; Healy v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161 A. 151 (1932).
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care by his excessive voluntary consumption of intoxicating liquor
which relieves the vendor of liability for any injury resulting from a
patron's intoxication. 6 Some courts have even extended this to situa-
tions in which the patron has become so intoxicated as to render
himself incapable of exercising any resistance to further consump-
tion.7 The reasoning behind these decisions is that it is the patron's
own voluntary consumption which created his intoxicated condition
in the first place 8
Second, courts have held that the common law does not recog-
nize any duty owed by the vendor of intoxicating liquor to patrons
or third persons who may be injured by an intoxicated patron far
removed from his establishment. 9 The basis for this reasoning is
that it is not reasonably foreseeable that the sale of intoxicating liq-
uor to a patron will naturally result in an injury to some third per-
son. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Cowman v. Hansen,10 stated
that "[W]hile it may be foreseen, or it may be a natural result
of furnishing an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person, that he
himself will get hurt, it is not at all clear that he will naturally as-
sault someone, drive a car and injure or kill another or do some
other tortious act.""
Finally, some courts have held that under the common law the
voluntary consumption of the intoxicating liquor, and not the sale, is
the proximate cause of any injury sustained by third persons.12 Any
6. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alas. 1950,) ; Collier v. Stamatis,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); State ex reL Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d
754 (1951) ; BeCk v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955) Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis.
66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
7. King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886) Demge v. Feiersteln, 222
Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936). Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967).
This case, although not directly In point, would seem to support the reasoning that the
voluntary consumption by the patron in rendering him incapable of consent to further
sales relieves the vendor of any liability for further sales once the patron has become
incapable of consent. Contra, Pratt v. Daly, 65 Ariz. 353, 104 P.2d 147 (1940). In this
case the court took the view that one may become so addicted to the use of alcohol as to
be utterly incapable of resisting the urge to consume liquor, and therefore incapable of
consenting to receive and drink it, thus bringing a vendors sale of intoxicating liquor
to one known to be so addiqted to its use within the rule of the habit forming drug
cases. See Annot., 130 A.L.R. 353 (1941), Third Persons Right of Action Against a
Vendor of Habit Forming Drugs.
8. King v. Henke, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886) ; Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn.
432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967) ; Demege v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936).
Contra, Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 353, 104, P.2d 147 (1940). See Annot., 130 A.L.R. 353
(1941), Third Persons Right of Action Against a Vendor of Habit Forming Drugs.
9. Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967). This case involved a
wrongful death action brought on behalf of the deceased patron whose death was
brought about by his consumption of intoxicating liquor furnished by the vendor. Al-
though Connecticut did have a Dram Shop Act, the Act was held not to extend to the
consumer.
10. Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958). This case involved a
wrongful death action in which the defendant vendor sold 3.2 beer to a patron who
became intoxicated and negligently drove his automobile resulting in his death. Although
Iowa had a Dram Shop Act, it did not apply to beer containing less than 4 percent of
alcohol by weight.
11. id.
12. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alas. 1950); Collier v. Stanatis,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682
(1958) ; State ex reL. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754, (1951) ; Beck v. Groe,
245 Minn. 28, 70' N.W.2d 886 (1955) ; Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
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injury that may result from the sale of intoxicating liquor is consid-
ered only remotely possible and that various unforeseeable interven-
ing circumstances are more directly responsible for the injury sus-
tained by third persons. 13
To the extent that the common law rule of nonliability to the
vendor of intoxicating liquors is based on the absence of any duty
owed to third persons who may be injured by reason of a patron's
intoxication, and application of common law principles of foresee-
ability and proximate cause to the vendor of intoxicating liquor, the
court in the instant case was persuaded by the reasoning of the re-
cent trend of decisions and rejected the common law rule.' 4
This trend in reevaluating the traditional application of proxi-
mate cause and foreseeability to the vendor of intoxicating liquor was
strongly stated by the New York Supreme Court of Otsego County
in Berkely v. Park. 5 In that decision the New York court strongly
attacked the common law application of proximate cause to vendors
of intoxicating liquor rejecting as "simply unreal" the distinction
that the sale of liquor is only a remote cause of resulting injury to
third persons due to intoxication while consumption is a proximate
cause. 6 The rule is well settled that for a negligent act to be a
proximate cause of injury, the injury need be only a natural and
probable result of the negligent act; and the consequence be one
which in the light of the circumstances should have been reasonably
foreseen or anticipated."1 In applying this rule to the vendor of in-
toxicating liquor, the court cited Rappaport v. Nichols18 which held
that the negligent operation of an automobile by an intoxicated pa-
tron is a normal incident of intoxication, which may have reason-
ably been foreseen by the vendor.- "This is particularily evident
in current times where traveling by car to and from the tavern is
so common place and accidents resulting from drinking are so fre-
quent." 20
In the instant case, the California court relying on the basic prin-
13. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900. (D. Alas. 1950); Collier v. Stamatis,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682
(1958) ; State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) ; Beck v. Groe,
245 Minn. 28,70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
14, Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
15. Berkely v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290, (Sup. Ct. Otsego County
1965). Although New York had a Dram Shop Act, the plaintiff chose to bring the action
against the vendor for both negligence and under the Dram Shop Act. The case was heard
on a motion by the defendant vendor to dismiss the causes of action based on allegations
of common law negligence. The court denied defendant's motion holding that the exist-
ence of a statute does not prevent an action for common law negligence. But see Garcia
v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1966).
16. Berkely v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. Otsego County
1965).
17. Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966). See also RESTATnMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 449 (1966).




ciples of proximate cause and foreseeability, established by other
negligence cases decided in California 21 and similar to those stated
in Berkely22 held that the furnishing of an alcoholic beverage to an
intoxicated person may be a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by
that individual upon a third person.2 3 "If such furnishing is a prox-
imate cause, it is so because the consumption, resulting intoxication,
and injury-producing conduct. . . is one of the hazards which makes
such furnishing negligent. ' 24
The primary question to be answered in any case involving the
liability of the vendor of intoxicating liquor for injuries sustained by
reason of a patron's intoxication is whether the vendor owes any
duty of care to those individuals who may be injured by an intox-
icated patron. Once a duty of care is established the issues of fore-
seeability and proximate cause are submitted to the jury for their
determination.
In Berkely25 the court stressed the point that:
[E]arly cases did not recognize any duty of an inn-
keeper to the traveling public because a serious hazard did
not exist. Through lack of necessity, this phase of negligence
liability did not develop. However, there did exist General
Common Law Rules of negligence liability based on foresee-
ability and proximate cause. Under the skillful interpreta-
tion of our courts, it has been adapted to changing times
and conditions of our civilization.2 6
Many courts have held, through the doctrine of negligence per
se, that particular legislation can create both a duty and standard
which constitutes the proper conduct of a reasonable man.27 This
occurs when a court determines that certain legislation is designed
to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff against a
type of harm which has in fact occured as a result of violation of
the statute.2
In the instant case a duty of care was imposed upon the vendor
by Business and Professions Code section 25602. 2 9 This provision
21. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
22. Berkely v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. Otsego Coufnty
1965).
23. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
24. Id. at 159.
25. Berkely v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. Otsego County 1965).
26. Id. at 293.
27. Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont 1969); Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960) ; Davis
v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d
847 (1966) ; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
28. Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960) ; Davis
v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d
847 (1966) ; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
29. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971).
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was held to have been adopted for the purpose of protecting mem-
bers of the general public from injuries and damage resulting from
the excessive use of intoxicating liquor.3 0 The court found support
for its interpretation in the decisions of those jurisdictions in which
similar statutes have been enacted and were found to be enacted for
the purpose of protecting the general public against injuries result-
ing from intoxication. 1
Some courts have found a duty of care imposed on the vendor
of intoxicating liquor in the absence of statute.3 2 Justice Musmanno,
speaking for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, found a duty to exist
in the absence of statute when he stated that:
The first prime requisite to de-intoxicate one who has,
because of alcohol, lost control over his reflexes, judgment
and sense of responsibility to others, is to stop pouring
alcohol into him. This is a duty which everyone owes to so-
ciety and to law entirely apart from any statute. 33
Aside from the purely legal arguments which have been put
forth by the recent trend of decisions abrogating the common law
rule, there are several policy reasons which deserve mention. First,
the risk of damage and personal injuries to members of the public
caused by alcohol far outweigh any social utility gained by the sale
of alcohol.3 4 Second, by the exercise of ordinary care, the vendor,
operating at the source of the problem is much better able to con-
trol the consumption of liquor by the patron and the ultimate damage
and injury he may cause.35 Third, extension of liability to the ven-
dor will assure an injured third person an adequate remedy while
ultimately shifting the loss from the vendor to that segment of the
population which consumes alcoholic beverages8 6 "The cost of the
vendor's liabililty insurance would be reflected in the price of his
product, resulting in the cost of liquor-caused injuries being borne
by those who consume the liquor. '3 7 Finally, subjecting the vendor
to liability for injuries sustained by third persons who may be in-
Business and Professions Code § 25602 provides: "Every person who sells, furnishes,
gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any
habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
30. Id. at 159.
31. Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th cir. 1959), cert. denisd, 362 U.S. 903 (1960) ; Davis
v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d
847 (1966) ; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) ; Contra, Collier v.
Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945).
32. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 650 (1964).
33. Id. at 553.
34. 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1017-18 (1969).




jured by an intoxicated patron would be an effective deterent to un-
lawful and negligent sales by the vendor.38
By application of standard principles of tort analysis, applicable
statutory standards, and its own holdings in closely analogous cases,
the Supreme Court of California has rendered a decision in accord-
ance with today's standards of wisdom and justice.
SCOTT BALLOU
CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT To COUNSEL-EXTRAJUDICIAL PHOTO-
GRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION-Appellant was arrested and charged
with the commission of several bank robberies. Three days after
counsel had been appointed, appellant was placed in a lineup which
was conducted by law enforcement authorities and attended by ap-
pellant's counsel and fifty eyewitnesses to the various bank rob-
beries. Prior to this lineup, the authorities had confronted each of
the eyewitnesses with photographs, including that of the appellant,
for identification. The photographic display was conducted in the
absence of accused's counsel. The United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, reversed the convictions, holding that an accused
who is in custody is entitled to counsel at photographic confronta-
tions with prospective witnesses and that it was error to allow evi-
cence of the identification of accused. United States v. Zeiler, 427
F. 2d 1305 (3rd Cir. 1970).
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
guarantees that anyone who is a defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion shall enjoy the right to have assistance of counsel in preparing
a defense.1 Failure of authorities to comply with this fundamental
right is deemed to contravene the Fourteenth Amendment 2 requir-
ing that convictions be reversed.3
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether the right to
counsel is applicable to photographic pretrial identification proce-
dures conducted by law enforcement authorities. To achieve this pur-
pose, it is necessary to examine some of the cases that have de-
veloped the law as it relates to pretrial identification procedures and
the Sixth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court cases of United States v.
38. Id.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
3. Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341
(1963).
